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Study Humans

  • 1 Study Humans

    University: SH

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > Study Humans

  • 2 First-in-Humans Study

    Медицина: Исследование первого применения препарата у человека (Первое исследование на I фазе клинических испытаний, в котором новый препарат впервые назначают человеку)

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > First-in-Humans Study

  • 3 First-in-Humans Study

    Первое исследование на I фазе клинических испытаний, в котором новый препарат впервые назначают человеку.

    English-Russian glossary of clinical practice > First-in-Humans Study

  • 4 SH

    1) Компьютерная техника: Single Head, Src Homolog
    2) Морской термин: однокорпусный (single hull)
    3) Американизм: SENATE HART Office Building
    7) Сельское хозяйство: sulfhydryl
    8) Шутливое выражение: Sonic Heroes
    9) Математика: The Subspace Of H
    11) Юридический термин: Sub Heading
    12) Страхование: Strengthened for heavy cargoes
    13) Грубое выражение: Sexy Hotness, Shit Head, Super Hot
    14) Оптика: single heterostructure
    15) Политика: St. Helena
    16) Сокращение: Parachute retarded (Russia), Saint Helena, Sary Shagan (Russia), Schuberth Helme GmbH (Germany), Serbo-croatian, Support Helicopter, scleroscope hardness, shackle, sheeting, shower, shunt, shield (electronic device), Settlement House (Расчетная палата ММВБ (MICEX))
    19) Космонавтика: Scratch Hardness
    20) Картография: school house
    22) Пищевая промышленность: Super Hardy
    23) Фирменный знак: Stanton Harcourt, Stein And Haff
    24) СМИ: Spartanburg Herald
    25) Деловая лексика: Specified Hours
    27) Сетевые технологии: stackable hub
    28) Полимеры: in shear, super-heavy, surfacehardened
    29) Программирование: Sense High, Suppress Header
    30) Сахалин Р: hydrocarbons saturation, shareholder
    31) Океанография: Southern Hemisphere
    32) Сахалин Ю: steam high pressure (30-50 bar)
    33) Расширение файла: SHell script
    34) Электротехника: subharmonic, superheater
    37) Должность: Senior Hunter, Super Hero
    38) Чат: Super Human
    39) Правительство: Side Hill, South Hill
    40) НАСА: Super Heat
    41) Единицы измерений: Semester Hours

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > SH

  • 5 Sh

    1) Компьютерная техника: Single Head, Src Homolog
    2) Морской термин: однокорпусный (single hull)
    3) Американизм: SENATE HART Office Building
    7) Сельское хозяйство: sulfhydryl
    8) Шутливое выражение: Sonic Heroes
    9) Математика: The Subspace Of H
    11) Юридический термин: Sub Heading
    12) Страхование: Strengthened for heavy cargoes
    13) Грубое выражение: Sexy Hotness, Shit Head, Super Hot
    14) Оптика: single heterostructure
    15) Политика: St. Helena
    16) Сокращение: Parachute retarded (Russia), Saint Helena, Sary Shagan (Russia), Schuberth Helme GmbH (Germany), Serbo-croatian, Support Helicopter, scleroscope hardness, shackle, sheeting, shower, shunt, shield (electronic device), Settlement House (Расчетная палата ММВБ (MICEX))
    19) Космонавтика: Scratch Hardness
    20) Картография: school house
    22) Пищевая промышленность: Super Hardy
    23) Фирменный знак: Stanton Harcourt, Stein And Haff
    24) СМИ: Spartanburg Herald
    25) Деловая лексика: Specified Hours
    27) Сетевые технологии: stackable hub
    28) Полимеры: in shear, super-heavy, surfacehardened
    29) Программирование: Sense High, Suppress Header
    30) Сахалин Р: hydrocarbons saturation, shareholder
    31) Океанография: Southern Hemisphere
    32) Сахалин Ю: steam high pressure (30-50 bar)
    33) Расширение файла: SHell script
    34) Электротехника: subharmonic, superheater
    37) Должность: Senior Hunter, Super Hero
    38) Чат: Super Human
    39) Правительство: Side Hill, South Hill
    40) НАСА: Super Heat
    41) Единицы измерений: Semester Hours

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > Sh

  • 6 sh

    1) Компьютерная техника: Single Head, Src Homolog
    2) Морской термин: однокорпусный (single hull)
    3) Американизм: SENATE HART Office Building
    7) Сельское хозяйство: sulfhydryl
    8) Шутливое выражение: Sonic Heroes
    9) Математика: The Subspace Of H
    11) Юридический термин: Sub Heading
    12) Страхование: Strengthened for heavy cargoes
    13) Грубое выражение: Sexy Hotness, Shit Head, Super Hot
    14) Оптика: single heterostructure
    15) Политика: St. Helena
    16) Сокращение: Parachute retarded (Russia), Saint Helena, Sary Shagan (Russia), Schuberth Helme GmbH (Germany), Serbo-croatian, Support Helicopter, scleroscope hardness, shackle, sheeting, shower, shunt, shield (electronic device), Settlement House (Расчетная палата ММВБ (MICEX))
    19) Космонавтика: Scratch Hardness
    20) Картография: school house
    22) Пищевая промышленность: Super Hardy
    23) Фирменный знак: Stanton Harcourt, Stein And Haff
    24) СМИ: Spartanburg Herald
    25) Деловая лексика: Specified Hours
    27) Сетевые технологии: stackable hub
    28) Полимеры: in shear, super-heavy, surfacehardened
    29) Программирование: Sense High, Suppress Header
    30) Сахалин Р: hydrocarbons saturation, shareholder
    31) Океанография: Southern Hemisphere
    32) Сахалин Ю: steam high pressure (30-50 bar)
    33) Расширение файла: SHell script
    34) Электротехника: subharmonic, superheater
    37) Должность: Senior Hunter, Super Hero
    38) Чат: Super Human
    39) Правительство: Side Hill, South Hill
    40) НАСА: Super Heat
    41) Единицы измерений: Semester Hours

    Универсальный англо-русский словарь > sh

  • 7 Bibliography

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     ■ Sternberg, R. J., & J. E. Davidson (1985). Cognitive development in gifted and talented. In F. D. Horowitz & M. O'Brien (Eds.), The gifted and talented (pp. 103-135). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
     ■ Storr, A. (1993). The dynamics of creation. New York: Ballantine Books. (Originally published in 1972.)
     ■ Stumpf, S. E. (1994). Philosophy: History and problems (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
     ■ Sulloway, F. J. (1996). Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives. New York: Random House/Vintage Books.
     ■ Thorndike, E. L. (1906). Principles of teaching. New York: A. G. Seiler.
     ■ Thorndike, E. L. (1970). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. Darien, CT: Hafner Publishing Co. (Originally published in 1911.)
     ■ Titchener, E. B. (1910). A textbook of psychology. New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Titchener, E. B. (1914). A primer of psychology. New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Toulmin, S. (1957). The philosophy of science. London: Hutchinson.
     ■ Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organisation of memory. London: Academic Press.
     ■ Turing, A. (1946). In B. E. Carpenter & R. W. Doran (Eds.), ACE reports of 1946 and other papers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Turkle, S. (1984). Computers and the second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York: Simon & Schuster.
     ■ Tyler, S. A. (1978). The said and the unsaid: Mind, meaning, and culture. New York: Academic Press.
     ■ van Heijenoort (Ed.) (1967). From Frege to Goedel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.
     ■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.
     ■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
     ■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
     ■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
     ■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
     ■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.
     ■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.
     ■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.
     ■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. New York: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Weizenbaum, J. (1976). Computer power and human reason: From judgment to cal culation. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
     ■ Wertheimer, M. (1945). Productive thinking. New York: Harper & Bros.
     ■ Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world. New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Whorf, B. L. (1956). In J. B. Carroll (Ed.), Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Whyte, L. L. (1962). The unconscious before Freud. New York: Anchor Books.
     ■ Wiener, N. (1954). The human use of human beings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
     ■ Wiener, N. (1964). God & Golem, Inc.: A comment on certain points where cybernetics impinges on religion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Winograd, T. (1972). Understanding natural language. New York: Academic Press.
     ■ Winston, P. H. (1987). Artificial intelligence: A perspective. In E. L. Grimson & R. S. Patil (Eds.), AI in the 1980s and beyond (pp. 1-12). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
     ■ Winston, P. H. (Ed.) (1975). The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.
     ■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
     ■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.
     ■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.
     ■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).
     ■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.
     ■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.
     ■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography

  • 8 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 9 Marey, Etienne-Jules

    [br]
    b. 5 March 1830 Beaune, France
    d. 15 May 1904 Paris, France
    [br]
    French physiologist and pioneer of chronophotography.
    [br]
    At the age of 19 Marey went to Paris to study medicine, becoming particularly interested in the problems of the circulation of the blood. In an early communication to the Académie des Sciences he described a much improved device for recording the pulse, the sphygmograph, in which the beats were recorded on a smoked plate. Most of his subsequent work was concerned with methods of recording movement: to study the movement of the horse, he used pneumatic sensors on each hoof to record traces on a smoked drum; this device became known as the Marey recording tambour. His attempts to study the wing movements of a bird in flight in the same way met with limited success since the recording system interfered with free movement. Reading in 1878 of Muybridge's work in America using sequence photography to study animal movement, Marey considered the use of photography himself. In 1882 he developed an idea first used by the astronomer Janssen: a camera in which a series of exposures could be made on a circular photographic plate. Marey's "photographic gun" was rifle shaped and could expose twelve pictures in approximately one second on a circular plate. With this device he was able to study wing movements of birds in free flight. The camera was limited in that it could record only a small number of images, and in the summer of 1882 he developed a new camera, when the French government gave him a grant to set up a physiological research station on land provided by the Parisian authorities near the Porte d'Auteuil. The new design used a fixed plate, on which a series of images were recorded through a rotating shutter. Looking rather like the results provided by a modern stroboscope flash device, the images were partially superimposed if the subject was slow moving, or separated if it was fast. His human subjects were dressed all in white and moved against a black background. An alternative was to dress the subject in black, with highly reflective strips and points along limbs and at joints, to produce a graphic record of the relationships of the parts of the body during action. A one-second-sweep timing clock was included in the scene to enable the precise interval between exposures to be assessed. The fixed-plate cameras were used with considerable success, but the number of individual records on each plate was still limited. With the appearance of Eastman's Kodak roll-film camera in France in September 1888, Marey designed a new camera to use the long rolls of paper film. He described the new apparatus to the Académie des Sciences on 8 October 1888, and three weeks later showed a band of images taken with it at the rate of 20 per second. This camera and its subsequent improvements were the first true cinematographic cameras. The arrival of Eastman's celluloid film late in 1889 made Marey's camera even more practical, and for over a decade the Physiological Research Station made hundreds of sequence studies of animals and humans in motion, at rates of up to 100 pictures per second. Marey pioneered the scientific study of movement using film cameras, introducing techniques of time-lapse, frame-by-frame and slow-motion analysis, macro-and micro-cinematography, superimposed timing clocks, studies of airflow using smoke streams, and other methods still in use in the 1990s. Appointed Professor of Natural History at the Collège de France in 1870, he headed the Institut Marey founded in 1898 to continue these studies. After Marey's death in 1904, the research continued under the direction of his associate Lucien Bull, who developed many new techniques, notably ultra-high-speed cinematography.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Foreign member of the Royal Society 1898. President, Académie des Sciences 1895.
    Bibliography
    1860–1904, Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Sciences de Paris.
    1873, La Machine animale, Paris 1874, Animal Mechanism, London.
    1893, Die Chronophotographie, Berlin. 1894, Le Mouvement, Paris.
    1895, Movement, London.
    1899, La Chronophotographie, Paris.
    Further Reading
    ——1992, Muybridge and the Chronophotographers, London. Jacques Deslandes, 1966, Histoire comparée du cinéma, Vol. I, Paris.
    BC / MG

    Biographical history of technology > Marey, Etienne-Jules

  • 10 Исследование первого применения препарата у человека

    1) Medicine: First-in-Humans Study (Первое исследование на I фазе клинических испытаний, в котором новый препарат впервые назначают человеку)
    2) Pharmacology: First-in-Man Study

    Универсальный русско-английский словарь > Исследование первого применения препарата у человека

  • 11 behavioral science

    HR
    academic disciplines such as sociology and psychology that relate to the study of the way in which humans conduct themselves. In the field of management, the behavioral sciences are used to study organization behavior.

    The ultimate business dictionary > behavioral science

  • 12 μάρτυς

    μάρτυς, μάρτυρος, ὁ dat. pl. μάρτυσιν (Pind., Hdt.+; ins, pap, LXX; TestAbr A 13 p. 92, 22 [Stone p. 32]; TestLevi 19:3; Philo, Joseph.; apolog. exc. Ar.)
    ① one who testifies in legal matters, witness (Just., A I, 23, 3; Ath. 3, 2) Ac 7:58; Mt 18:16; 2 Cor 13:1; 1 Ti 5:19 (the last 3 after Dt 19:15; cp. Jos., Vi. 256 and Hipponax [VI B.C.] 47 D.3 ἐλθὼν σὺν τριοῖσι μάρτυσιν); Hb 10:28 (Dt 17:6.—ἐπὶ μάρτυσι also Appian, Bell. Civ. 3, 14 §49). τί ἔτι χρείαν ἔχομεν μαρτύρων; what further need have we of witnesses? (Pla., Rep. 1, 340a τί δεῖται μάρτυρος; αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ Θρασύμαχος ὁμολογεῖ) Mt 26:65; Mk 14:63. μάρτυρες ψευδεῖς false witnesses (Demosth. 29, 28) Ac 6:13 (Mel., P. 79, 572). There is a suggestion of bureaucratic protocol relating to the account of the prudent and blameless men whom the Roman church sent to Corinth and who μάρτυρες ἔσονται μεταξὺ ὑμῶν κ. ἡμῶν 1 Cl 63:3.
    ② one who affirms or attests, testifier, witness transf. sense of mng. 1, of anyone who can or should testify to anything.
    ⓐ of God (or the exalted Christ) as witness (deities as witnesses oft. Pind. et al.; Philo; Jos., Bell. 1, 595, Ant. 1, 209; TestLevi 19:3; SibOr, Fgm. 1, 4; Just., A II, 12, 4 θεὸν … μάρτυρα ἔχοντες. Orig., C. Cels. 1, 46, 26 θεὸς [sc. ἐστιν] μ. τοῦ ἡμετέρου συνειδότος); as a formula God is my witness (that I am telling the truth) Ro 1:9; Phil 1:8; shortened θεὸς μ. 1 Th 2:5; cp. vs. 10 (here also Jos., Ant. 15, 130 μ. ὑμᾶς ποιούμενος). μ. μοι ἐν ᾧ δέδεμαι IPhld 7:2. μάρτυρα τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι call upon God as witness 2 Cor 1:23 (cp. 1 Km 12:5f; 20:23; Polyb. 11, 6, 4 τ. θεοὺς ἐπικαλέσεσθε μάρτυρας; Heliod. 1, 25, 1; Galen VI 775 Kühn; likewise of calling upon deities, Hippol., Ref. 9, 15, 6: τοὺς ἑπτὰ μάρτυρας μαρτύρομαι).
    ⓑ of humans (cp. Pind. O. 4, 5): witnessing by eye and ear (X., Ages. 4, 5; Pla., Ep. 1 p. 309a; Aelian, VH 10, 6; Jos., Ant. 18, 299; Tat. 31, 1; 36, 1) 1 Th 2:10; 1 Ti 6:12; 2 Ti 2:2.—Also of those witnesses whose faith is tried and true τοσοῦτον νέφος μαρτύρων Hb 12:1.—Of witnesses of events which they know about, without having experienced them personally (acc. to Strabo 7, 3, 7 p. 300 Hesiod is μάρτυς with regard to the Scythians): the teachers of the law bear witness to the murder of the prophets by their ancestors, by erecting tombs for the prophets Lk 11:48 (μαρτυρεῖτε v.l.).
    ⓒ of witnesses who bear a divine message (Epict. 3, 26, 28 God uses the wise men as his μάρτυρες) Rv 11:3 (though the mng. approaches martyr [s. 3 below] here; cp. vs. 7. S. DHaugg, D. zwei Zeugen-Apk 11:1–13, ’36; JConsidine, CBQ 8, ’46. 377–92). In this sense, above all, of Jesus’ disciples as the witnesses of his life, death, and resurrection: ἔσεσθέ μου μάρτυρες you will be my witnesses Ac 1:8; cp. 13:31 (Ps.-Demetr. 222 μάρτυς σου γίνεται). W. obj. gen. of the thing witnessed: witness for/of (Jos., C. Ap. 1, 4 τῶν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ λεγομένων μ., Ant. 4, 40; ἀληθείας μ. of Polycarp Iren. 3, 3, 4 [Harv. II 13, 4]; παραδόσεως of the Ephesian congregation 3, 3, 4 [Harv. II 15, 6]; Orig., C. Cels. 1, 47, 24) Lk 24:48; Ac 1:22; 3:15; 5:32; 10:39; 26:16. μ. τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθημάτων a witness of the sufferings of Christ 1 Pt 5:1. ἔσῃ μ. αὐτῷ πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους you will be a witness for him to all people Ac 22:15 (Epict. 3, 24, 113 μ. πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους).—10:41. Danker, Benefactor 442–47.
    ③ one who witnesses at cost of life, martyr, in the usage of the persecuted church τὸ αἷμα Στεφάνου τοῦ μάρτυρός σου Ac 22:20. Of Antipas ὁ μ. μου ὁ πιστός μου Rv 2:13 (cp. Pind., P. 1, 88 μάρτυρες πιστοί=dependable witnesses; on the textual problems of Rv 2:13 s. RBorger, TRu 52, ’87, 45–47). Onesimus μ. Χριστοῦ γεγένηται Phlm subscr. v.l. Gener. μάρτυρες Ἰησοῦ Rv 17:6; cp. MPol 2:2; 14:2; 15:2; 16:2 v.l.; 17:3; 19:1. Of Zacharias μ. εἰμι τοῦ θεοῦ GJs 25:3 (s. de Strycker ad loc.). Since Rv also calls Jesus (as well as Antipas) ὁ μάρτυς ὁ πιστός 1:5; 3:14, these pass. are prob. to be classed here (cp. Ps 88:38), but with awareness of strong focus in all the NT passages in this classification on the fact of witness. The death of Jesus was early regarded as the first martyrdom.—For an analysis of the question how μάρτυς=‘witness’ came to mean ‘martyr’, s. FKattenbusch, ZNW 4, 1903, 111ff; KHoll, variously, then Gesamm. Aufsätze II 1928, 103ff; ASchlatter, BFChTh 19, 3, 1915; PCorssen, NJklA 35, 1915, 481ff, 37, 1916, 424ff, ZNW 15, 1914, 221ff w. several continuations until 18, 1917, 249ff, Sokrates 6, 1918, 106ff; Rtzst., Hist. Mon. 1916, 85; 257, NGG 1916, 417ff, Her 52, 1917, 442ff; FDornseiff, ARW 22, 1923/24, 133ff; HDelehaye, Analecta Bollandiana 39, 1921, 20ff, Sanctus 1927 (2’33), 74ff (75, 1 lit.). ELohmeyer, D. Idee des Martyriums im Judent. u. Urchristent.: ZST 5, 1927/28, 232–49; GFitzer, D. Begriff des μ. im Judent. u. Urchristent., diss. Bresl. 1929; HLietzmann, Martys: Pauly-W. XIV 2, 1930, 2044–52; OMichel, Prophet u. Märt. ’32; RCasey, Μάρτυς: Beginn. I 5, ’33, 30–37; EStauffer, Märtyrertheologie u. Täuferbewegg.: ZKG 52, ’33, 545–98; DRiddle, The Martyr Motif in Mk: JR 4, 1924, 174–91, Hb, 1 Cl and the Persecution of Domitian: JBL 43, 1924, 329–48, From Apocalypse to Martyrology: ATR 9, 1927, 260–80, The Martyrs: A Study in Social Control ’31, Die Verfolgungslogien im formgesch. u. soziol. Bed.: ZNW 33, ’34, 271–89; HvCampenhausen, D. Idee des Martyriums in d. alten Kirche2 ’64; EPeterson, Zeuge d. Wahrh. ’37; EBurnier, Le notion de témoignage dans le NT ’37; HSurkau, Martyrien in jüd. u. frühchristl. Zt. ’38; HFischel, Martyr and Prophet (in Jewish lit.), JQR 37, ’46/47, 265–80; 363–86; EGünther, Μάρτυς, D. Gesch. eines Wortes ’41, Zeuge u. Märtyrer, ZNW 47, ’56, 145–61. ELohse, Märtyrer u. Gottesknecht ’55; HvanVliet, No Single Testimony (Dt 19:15) ’58; NBrox, Zeuge u. Märtyrer ’61.—B. 1436; ATrites, Μάρτυς and Martyrdom in the Apocalypse, A Semantic Study: NovT 15, ’73, 72–80, The NT Concept of Witness ’77; GDragas, Martyrdom and Orthodoxy in the NT Era: Greek Orthodox Theological Review 30, ’85, 287–96; PVassiliadis, The Translation of μαρτυρία Ιησοῦ in Rv: BT 36, ’85, 129–34; M-ERosenblatt, Paul the Accused ’95, 1–21; Kl. Pauly III 1059f; BHHW II 1156f.—DELG. M-M. EDNT. TW. Spicq. Sv.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > μάρτυς

  • 13 υἱός

    υἱός, οῦ, ὁ (Hom.+; loanw. in rabb.) prim. ‘son’
    ① a male who is in a kinship relationship either biologically or by legal action, son, offspring, descendant
    ⓐ the direct male issue of a person, son τέξεται υἱόν Mt 1:21; GJs 14:2 (cp. Mel., P. 8, 53 ὡς γὰρ υἱὸς τεχθείς). Cp. Mt 1:23 (Is 7:14) and 25; 10:37 (w. θυγάτηρ); Mk 12:6a; Lk 1:13, 31, 57; 11:11; 15:11 (on this JEngel, Die Parabel v. Verlorenen Sohn: ThGl 18, 1926, 54–64; MFrost, The Prodigal Son: Exp. 9th ser., 2, 1924, 56–60; EBuonaiuti, Religio 11, ’35, 398–402); Ac 7:29; Ro 9:9 (cp. Gen 18:10); Gal 4:22 al. W. gen. Mt 7:9; 20:20f; 21:37ab; Mk 6:3; 9:17; Lk 3:2; 4:22; 15:19; J 9:19f; Ac 13:21; 16:1; 23:16; Gal 4:30abc (Gen 21:10abc); Js 2:21; AcPlCor 2:29. Also ἐγὼ Φαρισαῖός εἰμι υἱὸς Φαρισαίων Ac 23:6 is prob. a ref. to direct descent. μονογενὴς υἱός (s. μονογενής 1) Lk 7:12. ὁ υἱὸς ὁ πρωτότοκος (πρωτότοκος 1) 2:7.
    ⓑ the immediate male offspring of an animal (Ps 28:1 υἱοὺς κριῶν; Sir 38:25. So Lat. filius: Columella 6, 37, 4) in our lit. only as foal ἐπὶ πῶλον υἱὸν ὑποζυγίου Mt 21:5 (cp. Zech 9:9 πῶλον νέον).
    ⓒ human offspring in an extended line of descent, descendant, son Ἰωσὴφ υἱὸς Δαυίδ Mt 1:20 (cp. Jos., Ant. 11, 73); s. 2dα below. υἱοὶ Ἰσραήλ (Ἰσραήλ 1) Mt 27:9; Lk 1:16; Ac 5:21; 7:23, 37; 9:15; 10:36; Ro 9:27; 2 Cor 3:7, 13; Hb 11:22 al.; AcPlCor 2:32. οἱ υἱοὶ Λευί (Num 26:57) Hb 7:5. υἱὸς Ἀβραάμ Lk 19:9. υἱοὶ Ἀδάμ 1 Cl 29:2 (Dt 32:8). υἱοι Ῥουβήλ GJs 6:3.
    ⓓ one who is accepted or legally adopted as a son (Herodian 5, 7, 1; 4; 5; Jos, Ant. 2, 263; 20, 150) Ac 7:21 (cp. Ex 2:10).—J 19:26.
    ② a pers. related or closely associated as if by ties of sonship, son, transf. sense of 1
    ⓐ of a pupil, follower, or one who is otherw. a spiritual son (SIG 1169, 12 οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ θεοῦ=the pupils and helpers [40] of Asclepius; sim. Maximus Tyr. 4, 2c; Just., D. 86, 6 οἱ υἱοὶ τῶν προφητῶν.—Some combination w. παῖδες is the favorite designation for those who are heirs of guild-secrets or who are to perpetuate a skill of some kind: Pla., Rep. 3, 407e, Leg. 6, 769b; Dionys. Hal., Comp. Verbi 22 p. 102, 4 Us./Rdm. ῥητόρων παῖδες; Lucian, Anach. 19, Dial. Mort. 11, 1 Χαλδαίων π.=dream-interpreters, Dips. 5 ἱατρῶν π., Amor. 49; Himerius, Or. 48 [=Or. 14], 13 σοφῶν π.): the ‘sons’ of the Pharisees Mt 12:27; Lk 11:19. Peter says Μᾶρκος ὁ υἱός μου 1 Pt 5:13 (perh. w. a component of endearment; s. Μᾶρκος). As a familiar form of address by a cherished mentor Hb 12:5 (Pr 3:11; ParJer 5:28; 7:24). υἱοὶ καὶ θυγατέρες B 1:1.
    ⓑ of the individual members of a large and coherent group (cp. the υἷες Ἀχαιῶν in Homer; also PsSol 2:3 οἱ υἱοὶ Ἰερουσαλήμ; Dio Chrys. 71 [21], 15; LXX) οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ λαοῦ μου 1 Cl 8:3 (scripture quot. of unknown origin). υἱοὶ γένους Ἀβραάμ Ac 13:26. οἱ υἱοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (Gen 11:5; Ps 11:2, 9; 44:3; TestLevi 3:10; TestZeb 9:7; GrBar 2:4) the sons of men=humans (cp. dγ below) Mk 3:28; Eph 3:5; 1 Cl 61:2 (of the earthly rulers in contrast to the heavenly king).
    ⓒ of one whose identity is defined in terms of a relationship with a person or thing
    α. of those who are bound to a personality by close, non-material ties; it is this personality that has promoted the relationship and given it its character: son(s) of: those who believe are υἱοὶ Ἀβραάμ, because Abr. was the first whose relationship to God was based on faith Gal 3:7. In a special sense the devout, believers, are sons of God, i.e., in the light of the social context, people of special status and privilege (cp. PsSol 17:27; Just., D, 124, 1; Dio Chrys. 58 [75], 8 ὁ τοῦ Διὸς ὄντως υἱός; Epict. 1, 9, 6; 1, 3, 2; 1, 19, 9; Sextus 58; 60; 135; 376a; Dt 14:1; Ps 28:1; 72:15; Is 43:6 [w. θυγατέρες μου]; 45:11; Wsd 2:18; 5:5; 12:21 al.; Jdth 9:4, 13; Esth 8:12q; 3 Macc 6:28; SibOr 3, 702) Mt 5:45; Lk 6:35; Ro 8:14, 19 (‘Redeemer figures’ EFuchs, Die Freiheit des Glaubens, ’49, 108; against him EHommel in ThViat 4, ’52, 118, n. 26); 9:26 (Hos 2:1); 2 Cor 6:18 (w. θυγατέρες, s. Is 43:6 cited above); Gal 3:26 (cp. PsSol 17:27); 4:6a, 7ab (here the υἱός is the κληρονόμος and his opposite is the δοῦλος); Hb 2:10 (JKögel, Der Sohn u. die Söhne: Eine exeget. Studie zu Hb 2:5–18, 1904); 12:5–8 (in vs. 8 opp. νόθος, q.v.); Rv 21:7; 2 Cl 1:4; B 4:9. Corresp. there are sons of the devil (on this subj. cp. Hdb. on J 8:44) υἱὲ διαβόλου Ac 13:10. οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ (masc.) Mt 13:38b. τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ ἐν Ἅιδου ApcPt Rainer. In υἱοί ἐστε τῶν φονευσάντων τοὺς προφήτας Mt 23:31 this mng. is prob. to be combined w. sense 1c. The expr. υἱοὶ θεοῦ Mt 5:9 looks to the future (s. Betz, SM ad loc.; cp. KKöhler, StKr 91, 1918, 189f). Lk 20:36a signifies a status akin to that of angels (Ps 88:7; θεῶν παῖδες as heavenly beings: Maximus Tyr. 11, 5a; 12a; 13, 6a.—Hierocles 3, 424 the ἄγγελοι are called θεῶν παῖδες; HWindisch, Friedensbringer-Gottessöhne: ZNW 24, 1925, 240–60, discounts connection w. angels and contends for the elevation of the ordinary followers of Jesus to the status of Alexander the Great in his role as an εἰρηνηποιός [cp. Plut., Mor. 329c]; for measured critique of this view s. Betz, SM 137–42.).
    β. υἱός w. gen. of thing, to denote one who shares in it or who is worthy of it, or who stands in some other close relation to it, oft. made clear by the context; this constr. is prob. a Hebraism in the main, but would not appear barbaric (B-D-F §162, 6; Mlt-H. 441; Dssm., B p. 162–66 [BS 161–66]; PASA II 1884, no. 2 υἱὸς πόλεως [time of Nero; on this type of formulation SEG XXXIX, 1864]; IMagnMai 167, 5; 156, 12) οἱ υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου (αἰών 2a) Lk 16:8a (opp. οἱ υἱοί τοῦ φωτός vs. 8b); 20:34. τῆς ἀναστάσεως υἱοί (to Mediterranean publics the functional equivalent of ἀθάνατοι ‘immortals’; cp. ἀνάστασις 2b) 20:36b. υἱοὶ τῆς ἀνομίας (ἀνομία 1; cp. CD 6:15) Hv 3, 6, 1; ApcPt 1:3; τῆς ἀπειθείας (s. ἀπείθεια) Eph 2:2; 5:6; Col 3:6; τῆς ἀπωλείας ApcPt 1:2. ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας of Judas the informer J 17:12 (cp. similar expressions in Eur., Hec. 425; Menand., Dyscolus 88f: s. FDanker, NTS 7, ’60/61, 94), of the end-time adversary 2 Th 2:3. υἱοὶ τῆς βασιλείας (βασιλεία 1bη; s. SEG XXXIX, 1864 for related expressions) Mt 8:12; 13:38a. υἱοὶ βροντῆς Mk 3:17 (s. Βοανηργές). υἱὸς γεέννης (s. γέεννα) Mt 23:15; τ. διαθήκης (PsSol 17:15) Ac 3:25; εἰρήνης Lk 10:6. υἱοὶ τοῦ νυμφῶνος (s. νυμφών) Mt 9:15; Mk 2:19; Lk 5:34. υἱὸς παρακλήσεως Ac 4:36 (s. Βαρναβᾶς). υἱοὶ (τοῦ) φωτός (Hippol., Ref. 6, 47, 4 in gnostic speculation) Lk 16:8b (opp. υἱοὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου); J 12:36. υἱοὶ φωτός ἐστε καὶ υἱοὶ ἡμέρας 1 Th 5:5 (EBuonaiuti, ‘Figli del giorno e della luce’ [1 Th 5:5]: Rivista storico-critica delle Scienze teol. 6, 1910, 89–93).
    ⓓ in various combinations as a designation of the Messiah and a self-designation of Jesus
    α. υἱὸς Δαυίδ son of David of the Messiah (PsSol 17:21) Mt 22:42–45; Mk 12:35–37; Lk 20:41–44; B 12:10c. Specif. of Jesus as Messiah Mt 1:1a; 9:27; 12:23; 15:22; 20:30f; 21:9, 15; Mk 10:47f; Lk 18:38f.—WWrede, Jesus als Davidssohn: Vorträge u. Studien 1907, 147–77; WBousset, Kyrios Christos2 1921, 4, Rel.3 226f; ELohmeyer, Gottesknecht u. Davidssohn ’45, esp. 68; 72; 77; 84; TNicklin, Gospel Gleanings ’50, 251–56; WMichaelis, Die Davidsohnschaft Jesu usw., in D. histor. Jesus u. d. kerygm. Christus, ed. Ristow and Matthiae, ’61, 317–30; LFisher, ECColwell Festschr. ’68, 82–97.
    β. ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, υἱὸς θεοῦ (the) Son of God (for the phrase s. JosAs 6:2 al. Ἰωσὴφ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ; there is no undisputed evidence of usage as messianic title in pre-Christian Judaism [s. Dalman, Worte 219–24, Eng. tr. 268–89; Bousset, Kyrios Christos2 53f; EHuntress, ‘Son of God’ in Jewish Writings Prior to the Christian Era: JBL 54, ’35, 117–23]; cp. 4Q 246 col. 2, 1 [JFitzmyer, A Wandering Aramean ’79, 90–93; JCollins, BRev IX/3, ’93, 34–38, 57]. Among polytheists on the other hand, sons of the gods in a special sense [s. Just., A I, 21, 1f] are not only known to myth and legend, but definite historical personalities are also designated as such. Among them are famous wise men such as Pythagoras and Plato [HUsener, Das Weihnachtsfest2 1911, 71ff], and deified rulers, above all the Roman emperors since the time of Augustus [oft. in ins and pap: Dssm., B 166f=BS 166f, LO 294f=LAE 346f; Thieme 33]. According to Memnon [I B.C./ I A.D.]: 434 Fgm. 1, 1, 1 Jac., Clearchus [IV B.C.] carried his boasting so far as Διὸς υἱὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀνειπεῖν. Also, persons who were active at that time as prophets and wonder-workers laid claim to the title υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, e.g. the Samaritan Dositheus in Origen, C. Cels. 6, 11; sim. an Indian wise man who calls himself Διὸς υἱός Arrian, Anab. 7, 2, 3; cp. Did., Gen. 213, 18 ὁ Ἀβρὰμ υἱὸς θεοῦ διὰ δικαιοσύνην. S. GWetter, ‘Der Sohn Gottes’ 1916; Hdb. exc. on J 1:34; s. also Clemen2 76ff; ENorden, Die Geburt des Kindes 1924, 75; 91f; 132; 156f; EKlostermann, Hdb. exc. on Mk 1:11 [4th ed. ’50]; M-JLagrange, Les origines du dogme paulinien de la divinité de Christ: RB 45, ’36, 5–33; HPreisker, Ntl. Zeitgesch. ’37, 187–208; HBraun, ZTK 54, ’57, 353–64; ANock, ‘Son of God’ in Paul. and Hellen. Thought: Gnomon 33, ’61, 581–90 [=Essays on Religion and the Anc. World II, ’72, 928–39]—originality in Paul’s thought): Ps 2:7 is applied to Jesus υἱός μου εἶ σύ, ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε Lk 3:22 D; GEb 18, 37.—Ac 13:33; Hb 1:5a; 5:5; 1 Cl 36:4. Likew. Hos 11:1 (w. significant changes): Mt 2:15, and 2 Km 7:14: Hb 1:5b. The voice of God calls him ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός (s. ἀγαπητός 1) at his baptism Mt 3:17; Mk 1:11; Lk 3:22; GEb 18, 37 and 39 and at the Transfiguration Mt 17:5; Mk 9:7; Lk 9:35 (here ἐκλελεγμένος instead of ἀγαπ.); 2 Pt 1:17. Cp. J 1:34. The angel at the Annunciation uses these expressions in referring to him: υἱὸς ὑψίστου Lk 1:32; GJs 11:3 and υἱὸς θεοῦ Lk 1:35 (Ar. 15, 1 ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ὑψίστου. Cp. Just., A I, 23, 2 μόνος ἰδίως υἱὸς τῷ θεῷ γεγέννηται). The centurion refers to him at the crucifixion as υἱὸς θεοῦ Mt 27:54; Mk 15:39; GPt 11:45; cp. vs. 46 (CMann, ET 20, 1909, 563f; JPobee, The Cry of the Centurion, A Cry of Defeat: CFDMoule Festschr. ’70, 91–102; EJohnson, JSNT 31, ’87, 3–22 [an indefinite affirmation of Jesus]). The high priest asks εἰ σὺ εἶ ὁ Χριστὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ Mt 26:63 (DCatchpole, NTS 17, ’71, 213–26). Passers-by ask him to show that he is God’s Son 27:40; sim. the devil 4:3, 6; Lk 4:3, 9. On the other hand, evil spirits address him as the Son of God Mt 8:29; Mk 3:11; 5:7; Lk 4:41; 8:28; and disciples testify that he is Mt 14:33; 16:16. S. also Mk 1:1 (s. SLegg, Ev. Sec. Marc. ’35).—Jesus also refers to himself as Son of God, though rarely apart fr. the Fourth Gosp.: Mt 28:19 (the Risen Lord in the trinitarian baptismal formula); Mt 21:37f=Mk 12:6 (an allusion in the parable of the vinedressers).—Mt 27:43; Mk 13:32; Rv 2:18. The main pass. is the so-called Johannine verse in the synoptics Mt 11:27=Lk 10:22 (s. PSchmiedel, PM 4, 1900,1–22; FBurkitt, JTS 12, 1911, 296f; HSchumacher, Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu bei Mt 11:27 [Lk 10:22] 1912 [lit.]; Norden, Agn. Th. 277–308; JWeiss, Heinrici Festschr. 1914, 120–29, Urchristentum 1917, 87ff; Bousset, Kyrios Christos2 1921, 45ff; EMeyer I 280ff; RBultmann, Gesch. d. synopt. Trad.2 ’31, 171f; MDibelius, Die Formgeschichte des Evangeliums2 ’33, 259; MRist, Is Mt 11:25–30 a Primitive Baptismal Hymn? JR 15, ’35, 63–77; TArvedson, D. Mysterium Christi: E. Studie zu Mt 11:25–30, ’37; WDavies, ‘Knowledge’ in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Mt 11:25–30, HTR 45, ’53, 113–39; WGrundmann, Sohn Gottes, ZNW 47, ’56, 113–33; JBieneck, Sohn Gottes als Christusbez. der Synopt. ’51; PWinter, Mt 11:27 and Lk 10:22: NovT 1, ’56, 112–48; JJocz, Judaica 13, ’57, 129–42; OMichel/OBetz, Von Gott Gezeugt, Beih. ZNW [Jeremias Festschr.] 26, ’60, 3–23 [Qumran]).—Apart fr. the synoptics, testimony to Jesus as the Son of God is found in many parts of our lit. Oft. in Paul: Ro 1:3, 4, 9; 5:10; 8:3, 29, 32; 1 Cor 1:9; 15:28; 2 Cor 1:19; Gal 1:16; 2:20; 4:4; Eph 4:13; Col 1:13; 1 Th 1:10. Cp. Ac 9:20. In Hb: 1:2, 8; 4:14; 5:8; 6:6; 7:3, 28; 10:29. In greatest frequency in John (cp. Herm. Wr. 1, 6 the Λόγος as υἱὸς θεοῦ. Likew. Philo, Agr. 51 πρωτόγονος υἱός, Conf. Lingu. 146 υἱὸς θεοῦ.—Theoph. Ant. 2, 1 [p. 154, 12] ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅς ἐστιν καὶ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ; Iren. 3, 12, 2 [Harv. II 55, 2]): J 1:49; 3:16–18 (s. μονογενής 2), 35f; 5:19–26; 6:40; 8:35f; 10:36; 11:4, 27; 14:13; 17:1; 19:7; 20:31; 1J 1:3, 7; 2:22–24; 3:8, 23; 4:9f, 14f; 5:5, 9–13, 20; 2J 3, 9.—B 5:9, 11; 7:2, 9; 12:8; 15:5; Dg 7:4; 9:2, 4; 10:2 (τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ τὸν μονογενῆ; also ApcEsdr 6:16 p. 31, 22 Tdf.; ApcSed 9:1f); IMg 8:2; ISm 1:1; MPol 17:3; Hv 2, 2, 8; Hs 5, 2, 6 (ὁ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ ἀγαπητός); 8; 11; 5, 4, 1; 5, 5, 2; 3; 5; 5, 6, 1; 2; 4; 7 (on the Christology of the Shepherd s. Dibelius, Hdb. on Hs 5, also ALink and JvWalter [πνεῦμα 5cα]); Hs 8, 3, 2; 8, 11, 1. Cp. 9, 1, 1; 9, 12, 1ff.—In trinitarian formulas, in addition to Mt 28:19, also IMg 13:1; EpilMosq 5; D 7:1, 3.—The deceiver of the world appears w. signs and wonders ὡς υἱὸς θεοῦ D 16:4 (ApcEsdr 4:27 p. 28, 32 Tdf. ὁ λέγων• Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ [of Antichrist]).—EKühl, Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu 1907, 16–44; GVos, The Self-disclosure of Jesus 1926.—EBurton, ICC Gal 1921, 404–17; TNicklin, Gospel Gleanings ’50, 211–36; MHengel, The Son of God (tr. JBowden) ’76; DJones, The Title υἱὸς θεοῦ in Acts: SBLSP 24, ’85, 451–63.
    γ. ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου lit. ‘the son of the man’ (the pl. form οἱ υἱοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων appears freq. in the LXX to render בְּנֵי אָדָם = mortals, e.g. Gen 11:5; Ps 10:4; 11:2; cp. ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπολείας J 17:12 [s. 2cβ]) ‘the human being, the human one, the man’ in our lit. only as a byname in ref. to Jesus and in an exclusive sense the Human One, the Human Being, one intimately linked with humanity in its primary aspect of fragility yet transcending it, traditionally rendered ‘the Son of Man.’ The term is found predom. in the gospels, where it occurs in the synoptics about 70 times (about half as oft. if parallels are excluded), and in J 12 times (s. EKlostermann, Hdb. exc. on Mk 8:31). In every case the title is applied by Jesus to himself. Nowhere within a saying or narrative about him is it found in an address to him: Mt 8:20; 9:6; 10:23; 11:19; 12:8, 32, 40; 13:37, 41; 16:13, 27f; 17:9, 12, 22; 18:10 [11] v.l.; 19:28; 20:18, 28; 24:27, 30, 37, 39, 44; 25:13 v.l., 31; 26:2, 24ab, 45, 64; Mk 2:10, 28; 8:31, 38; 9:9, 12, 31; 10:33, 45; 13:26; 14:21ab, 41, 62; Lk 5:24; 6:5, 22; 7:34; 9:22, 26, 44, 56 v.l., 58; 11:30; 12:8, 10, 40; 17:22, 24, 26, 30; 18:8, 31; 19:10; 21:27, 36; 22:22, 48, 69; 24:7.—John (FGrosheide, Υἱὸς τ. ἀνθρ. in het Evang. naar Joh.: TSt 35, 1917, 242–48; HDieckmann, D. Sohn des Menschen im J: Scholastik 2, 1927, 229–47; HWindisch, ZNW 30, ’31, 215–33; 31, ’32, 199–204; WMichaelis, TLZ 85, ’60, 561–78 [Jesus’ earthly presence]) 1:51; 3:13, 14; 5:27 (BVawter, Ezekiel and John, CBQ 26, ’64, 450–58); 6:27, 53, 62; 8:28; 9:35; 12:23, 34; 13:31. Whether the component of fragility (suggested by OT usage in ref. to the brief span of human life and the ills to which it falls heir) or high status (suggested by traditions that appear dependent on Da 7:13, which refers to one ‘like a human being’), or a blend of the two dominates a specific occurrence can be determined only by careful exegesis that in addition to extra-biblical traditions takes account of the total literary structure of the document in which it occurs. Much neglected in the discussion is the probability of prophetic association suggested by the form of address Ezk 2:1 al. (like the OT prophet [Ezk 3:4–11] Jesus encounters resistance).—On Israelite thought contemporary w. Jesus and alleged knowledge of a heavenly being looked upon as a ‘Son of Man’ or ‘Man’, who exercises Messianic functions such as judging the world (metaph., pictorial passages in En 46–48; 4 Esdr 13:3, 51f) s. Bousset, Rel.3 352–55; NMessel, D. Menschensohn in d. Bilderreden d. Hen. 1922; ESjöberg, Kenna 1 Henok och 4 Esra tanken på den lidande Människosonen? Sv. Ex. Årsb. 5, ’40, 163–83, D. Menschensohn im äth. Hen. ’46. This view is in some way connected w. Da 7:13; acc. to some it derives its real content fr. an eschatological tradition that ultimately goes back to Iran (WBousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis 1907, 160–223; Reitzenstein, Erlösungsmyst. 119ff, ZNW 20, 1921, 18–22, Mysterienrel.3 418ff; Clemen2 72ff; CKraeling, Anthropos and Son of Man: A Study in the Religious Syncretism of the Hellenistic Orient 1927); acc. to this tradition the First Man was deified; he will return in the last times and usher in the Kingdom of God.—Outside the gospels: Ac 7:56 (v.l. τοῦ θεοῦ; GKilpatrick, TZ 21, ’65, 209); Rv 1:13; 14:14 (both after Da 7:13; sim. allusion to Da in Just., D. 31, 1). The quot. fr. Ps 8:5 in Hb 2:6 prob. does not belong here, since there is no emphasis laid on υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου. In IEph 20:2 Jesus is described as υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου καὶ υἱὸς θεοῦ. Differently B 12:10 Ἰησοῦς, οὐχὶ υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀλλὰ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ Jesus, not a man’s son, but Son of God.—HLietzmann, Der Menschensohn 1896; Dalman, Worte 191–219 (Eng. tr., 234–67); Wlh., Einl.2 123–30; PFiebig, Der Menschensohn 1901; NSchmidt, The Prophet of Nazareth 1905, 94–134, Recent Study of the Term ‘Son of Man’: JBL 45, 1926, 326–49; FTillmann, Der Menschensohn 1907; EKühl, Das Selbstbewusstsein Jesu 1907, 65ff; HHoltzmann, Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu, 1907, 49–75 (lit.), Ntl. Theologie2 I 1911, 313–35; FBard, D. Sohn d. Menschen 1908; HGottsched, D. Menschensohn 1908; EAbbott, ‘The Son of Man’, etc., 1910; EHertlein, Die Menschensohnfrage im letzten Stadium 1911, ZNW 19, 1920, 46–48; JMoffatt, The Theology of the Gospels 1912, 150–63; WBousset, Kyrios Christos2 1921, 5–22 (the titles of the works by Wernle and Althaus opposing his first edition [1913], as well as Bousset’s answer, are found s.v. κύριος, end); DVölter, Jesus der Menschensohn 1914, Die Menschensohnfrage neu untersucht 1916; FSchulthess, ZNW 21, 1922, 247–50; Rtzst., Herr der Grösse 1919 (see also the works by the same author referred to above in this entry); EMeyer II 335ff; HGressmann, ZKG n.s. 4, 1922, 170ff, D. Messias 1929, 341ff; GDupont, Le Fils d’Homme 1924; APeake, The Messiah and the Son of Man 1924; MWagner, Der Menschensohn: NKZ 36, 1925, 245–78; Guillaume Baldensperger, Le Fils d’Homme: RHPR 5, 1925, 262–73; WBleibtreu, Jesu Selbstbez. als der Menschensohn: StKr 98/99, 1926, 164–211; AvGall, Βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ 1926; OProcksch, D. Menschensohn als Gottessohn: Christentum u. Wissensch. 3, 1927, 425–43; 473–81; CMontefiore, The Synoptic Gospels2 1927 I 64–80; ROtto, Reich Gottes u. Menschensohn ’34, Eng. tr. The Kgdm. of God and the Son of Man, tr. Filson and Woolf2 ’43; EWechssler, Hellas im Ev. ’36, 332ff; PParker, The Mng. of ‘Son of Man’: JBL 60, ’41, 151–57; HSharman, Son of Man and Kingdom of God ’43; JCampbell, The Origin and Mng. of the Term Son of Man: JTS 48, ’47, 145–55; HRiesenfeld, Jésus Transfiguré ’47, 307–13 (survey and lit.); TManson, ConNeot 11, ’47, 138–46 (Son of Man=Jesus and his disciples in Mk 2:27f); GDuncan, Jesus, Son of Man ’47, 135–53 (survey); JBowman, ET 59, ’47/48, 283–88 (background); MBlack, ET 60, ’48f, 11–15; 32–36; GKnight, Fr. Moses to Paul ’49, 163–72 (survey); TNicklin, Gospel Gleanings ’50, 237–50; TManson (Da, En and gospels), BJRL 32, ’50, 171–93; TPreiss, Le Fils d’Homme: ÉThR 26/3, ’51, Life in Christ, ’54, 43–60; SMowinckel, He That Cometh, tr. Anderson, ’54, 346–450; GIber, Überlieferungsgesch. Unters. z. Begriff des Menschensohnes im NT, diss. Heidelb. ’53; ESjöberg, D. verborgene Menschensohn in den Ev. ’55; WGrundmann, ZNW 47, ’56, 113–33; HRiesenfeld, The Mythological Backgrd. of NT Christology, CHDodd Festschr. ’56, 81–95; PhVielhauer, Gottesreich u. Menschensohn in d. Verk. Jesu, GDehn Festschr. ’57, 51–79; ESidebottom, The Son of Man in J, ET 68, ’57, 231–35; 280–83; AHiggins, Son of Man- Forschung since (Manson’s) ‘The Teaching of Jesus’: NT Essays (TW Manson memorial vol.) ’59, 119–35; HTödt, D. Menschensohn in d. synopt. Überl. ’59 (tr. Barton ’65); JMuilenburg, JBL 79, ’60, 197–209 (Da, En); ESchweizer, JBL 79, ’60, 119–29 and NTS 9, ’63, 256–61; BvIersel, ‘Der Sohn’ in den synopt. Jesusworten, ’61 (community?); MBlack, BJRL 45, ’63, 305–18; FBorsch, ATR 45, ’63, 174–90; AHiggins, Jesus and the Son of Man, ’64; RFormesyn, NovT 8, ’66, 1–35 (barnasha=‘I’); SSandmel, HSilver Festschr. ’63, 355–67; JJeremias, Die älteste Schicht der Menschensohn-Logien, ZNW 58, ’67, 159–72; GVermes, MBlack, Aram. Approach3, ’67, 310–30; BLindars, The New Look on the Son of Man: BJRL 63, ’81, 437–62; WWalker, The Son of Man, Some Recent Developments CBQ 45, ’83, 584–607; JDonahue, Recent Studies on the Origin of ‘Son of Man’ in the Gospels, CBQ 48, ’86, 584–607; DBurkitt, The Nontitular Son of Man, A History and Critique: NTS 40, ’94 504–21 (lit.); JEllington, BT 40, ’89, 201–8; RGordon, Anthropos: 108–13.—B. 105; DELG. M-M. EDNT. TW. Sv.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > υἱός

  • 14 ἀνάστασις

    ἀνάστασις, εως, ἡ (s. ἀνίστημι; Aeschyl., Hdt.+ in var. mngs.).
    ① a change for the better in status, rising up, rise (La 3:63; Zech 3:8; Jos., Ant. 17, 212; 18, 301 [here of the ‘erection’ of a statue]) κεῖται εἰς πτῶσιν καὶ ἀ. πολλῶν he is destined for the fall and rise of many of Jesus Lk 2:34, i.e. because of him many will fall and others will rise, viz. in relation to God (for contrast w. πτῶσις cp. Evagrius Pont., Sent. 5, 19 p. 327 Frankenberg: ἡ μικρὰ τ. σώματος ἀνάστασίς ἐστιν ἡ μετάθεσις αὐτοῦ ἐκ πτώσεως τ. ἀσελγείας εἰς τὴν τ. ἁγιασμοῦ ἀνάστασιν).—Esp.
    ② resurrection from the dead, resurrection (Aeschyl., Eum. 648 ἅπαξ θανόντος οὔτις ἐστʼ ἀ. [cp. Job 7:9f; 16:22]; Ps.-Lucian, De Salt. 45; Ael. Aristid. 32, 25 K.=12 p. 142 D.; 46 p. 300 D.; IGR IV 743, 25 [ο]ἱ δὴ δ[είλ]αιοι πάντ[ες] εἰς ἀ[νά]στασιν|[----][the stone breaks off after ἀ. and some think that βλέποντες or the like is to be supplied]; 2 Macc 7:14; 12:43), and so
    ⓐ in the past: of Jesus’ res. (Orig., C. Cels. 5, 57, 25) Ac 1:22; 2:31; 4:33; Ro 6:5; Phil 3:10 (JFitzmyer, BRigaux Festschr., ’70, 411–25); 1 Pt 3:21; 1 Cl 42:3; ISm 3:1, 3; in more detail ἀ. ἐκ νεκρῶν 1 Pt 1:3; ἀ. νεκρῶν res. from the dead Ro 1:4; w. the passion of Jesus IEph 20:1; Mg 11; Tr ins; Phld ins; 8:2; 9:2; Sm 7:2; 12:2; cp. 1:2. τὸν Ἰησοῦν καὶ τὴν ἀ. εὐαγγελίζεσθαι proclaim Jesus and the res. i.e. his res., and in consequence, the possibility of a general res. Ac 17:18 (but s. 3 below. τὸν Ἰησοῦν καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν could also mean ‘the res. of Jesus’, as perh. Nicol Dam.: 90 Fgm. 130, 18 p. 400, 17 Jac. μνήμη τἀνδρὸς καὶ φιλοστοργίας=‘… the love of the man’); cp. vs. 32 and 4:2. Of the raisings from the dead by Elijah and Elisha ἔλαβον γυναῖκες ἐξ ἀ. τοὺς νεκροὺς αὐτῶν women (i.e. the widow of Zarephath and the Shunammite woman 3 Km 17:23; 4 Km 4:36) received their dead by res. Hb 11:35.
    ⓑ of the future res. (Theoph. Ant. 1, 13 [p. 86, 25]), linked with Judgment Day: described as ἀ. νεκρῶν (Did., Gen. 96, 13) Mt 22:31; Ac 23:6; 24:15, 21; 26:23; 1 Cor 15:12f; 21; 42; Hb 6:2; D 16:6; or ἀ. ἐκ νεκρῶν Lk 20:35; B 5:6; AcPlCor 2:35 (cp. Ar. 15, 3; Just., D. 45, 2); cp. IPol 7:1; Pol 7:1; MPol 14:2. ἀ. σαρκός (not found in the NT) AcPlCor 1:12; 2:24 (Just., D. 80, 5; σωμάτων Tat. 6, 1; Ath., R. 11 p. 59, 14). Of Jesus: τὴν ἀ. ποιεῖν bring about the res. (of the dead) B 5:7. Jesus’ Passion as our res. ISm 5:3. ἀθάνατος τῆς ἀ. καρπός 2 Cl 19:3. Described as ἀ. κρείττων Hb 11:35 in contrast w. the res. of the past, because the latter was, after all, followed by death. ἡ μέλλουσα ἀ. (Theoph. Ant. 2, 15 [p. 138, 17]) the future res. 1 Cl 24:1. ἡ κατὰ καιρὸν γινομένη ἀ. the res. that comes at regular intervals (i.e. seasons, day and night), as a type of the future res. 24:2.—More details in J, who mentions an ἀ. ἐν τῇ ἐσχάτῃ ἡμέρᾳ on the Last Day J 11:24 and differentiates betw. the ἀ. κρίσεως res. for judgment for the wicked and the ἀ. ζωῆς res. to life for those who do good 5:29. Christ calls himself ἡ ἀ. and ἡ ζωή 11:25, since he mediates both to humans.—Paul seeks to demonstrate the validity of belief in Jesus’ res. in terms of the res. of the dead in general 1 Cor 15:12ff (s. MDahl, The Res. of the Body. A Study of 1 Cor 15, ’62 and s. τάγμα 1b). γνῶναι … τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀ. αὐτου Phil 3:10.—Lk 14:14 mentions only a res. of the just, as in some intertestamental belief; likew. B 21:1. Hebraistically υἱοὶ τῆς ἀ. (w. υἱοὶ θεοῦ) children of the res.=sharers in the resurrection Lk 20:36. A second res. is presupposed by the ἀ. ἡ πρώτη of Rv 20:5f. Denial of res. by the Sadducees Mt 22:23, 28, 30f; Mk 12:18, 23; Lk 20:27, 33, 35f (on this see Schürer II 391; 411); by the Epicureans Ac 17:18 (ERohde, Psyche3 1903 II 331–35; cp. the ins 2 above, beg.); and by Christians 1 Cor 15:12 (prob. in the sense of Just., D. 80, 4 λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι νεκρῶν ἀνάστασιν, ἀλλʼ ἅμα τῷ ἀποθνῄσκειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι εἰς τ. οὐρανόν ‘they say there is no resurrection of the dead, but that at the time of death their souls are taken up into heaven’; s. JWilson, ZNW 59, ’68, 90–107); 2 Ti 2:18 (cp. Menander in Iren. 1, 23, 5 [Harv. I 195] resurrectionem enim per id quod est in eum baptisma, accipere eius discipulos, et ultra non posse mori, sed perseverare non senescentes et immortales [Menander teaches that] ‘his followers receive resurrection by being baptized into him, and that they face death no more, but live on without growing old, exempt from death’; cp. Just., A I, 26, 4; Valentinus in Clem. of Alex., Str. 4, 13, 91; Tertull., Carn. Resurr. 25 agnitio sacramenti [=ἡ τοῦ μυστηρίου γνῶσις] resurrectio).—FNötscher, Altoriental. u. atl. Auferstehungsglaube 1926; JLeipoldt, Sterbende u. auferstehende Götter 1923; Cumont3 ’31; ANikolainen, D. Auferstehungsglauben in d. Bibel u. in ihrer Umwelt. I Relgesch. Teil ’44. II NT ’46.—WBousset, Rel.3, 1926, 269–74 al.; Billerb. IV 1928, 1166–98.—AMeyer, D. Auferstehung Christi 1905; KLake, The Historical Evidence of Res. of Jesus Christ 1907; LBrun, D. Auferst. Christi in d. urchr. Überl. 1925; PGardner-Smith, The Narratives of the Resurrection 1926; SMcCasland, The Res. of Jesus ’32; MGoguel, La foi à la résurr. de Jésus dans le Christianisme primitif ’33; EFascher, ZNW 26, 1927, 1–26; EFuchs, ZKG 51, ’32, 1–20; AThomson, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? ’40; EHirsch, D. Auferstehungsgeschichten u. d. chr. Glaube ’40; PAlthaus, D. Wahrheit des kirchl. Osterglaubens2 ’41; WMichaelis, D. Erscheinungen des Auferstandenen ’44; ARamsey, The Res. of Christ ’45; JLeipoldt, Zu den Auferstehungsgeschichten: TLZ 73, ’48, 737–42 (rel.-Hist.); KRengstorf, Die Auferstehung Jesu2 ’54; GKoch, Die Auferstehung J. Christi ’59; HGrass, Ostergeschehen u. Osterberichte ’56; ELohse, Die Auferstehung J. Chr. im Zeugnis des Lk ’61; HvCampenhausen, Tradition and Life in the Early Church, ’68, 42–89; WCraig, Assessing the NT Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus ’89; GLüdemann, Die Auferstehung Jesu ’94. S. also τάφος 1.—KDeissner, Auferstehungshoffnung u. Pneumagedanke b. Pls 1912; GVos, The Pauline Doctrine of the Res.: PTR 27, 1929, 1–35; 193–226; FGuntermann, D. Eschatologie d. hl. Pls ’32; HMolitor, Die Auferstehung d. Christen und Nichtchristen nach d. Ap. Pls ’33; LSimeone, Resurrectionis iustorum doctr. in Ep. S. Pauli ’38; DStanley, Christ’s Resurrection in Pauline Soteriology ’61; CMoule, NTS 12, ’65/66, 106–23; MdeBoer, The Defeat of Death ’88; JHolleman, A Traditio-Historical Study of Paul’s Eschatology in 1 Cor 15 (NovT Suppl. 84), ’96.—RGrant, Miracle and Nat. Law ’52, 221–63. JBuitkamp, Auferstehungsglaube in den Qumrantexten, diss. Groningen ’64; GWild, Auferstehungsglaube des späten Israel, diss. Bonn. ’67; W. Pannenberg, Grundzüge der Christologie6 ’82, 74ff.
    ③ a deity within a polytheistic system, Resurrection Ac 17:18. This interpr., first set forth by Chrysostom (Hom. in Act. 38, 1), has found modern supporters (s. Haenchen ad loc.). The semantic issue arises from the fact that the narrative presents the auditors as theologically ignorant. Their assumption is that Paul seemed to be a proclaimer of ‘new divinities’ (vs. 18a). From their perspective the term ἀ. suggests a divinity named Resurrection (abstractions identified as divinities were not uncommon in the Gr-Rom. world, s. EA 19 ’92, 71–73). But the omniscient author informs the reader that bodily resurrection (as in 2 above) is meant.—DELG s.v. ἵστημι. M-M. TW. Sv.

    Ελληνικά-Αγγλικά παλαιοχριστιανική Λογοτεχνία > ἀνάστασις

  • 15 Intelligence

       There is no mystery about it: the child who is familiar with books, ideas, conversation-the ways and means of the intellectual life-before he begins school, indeed, before he begins consciously to think, has a marked advantage. He is at home in the House of intellect just as the stableboy is at home among horses, or the child of actors on the stage. (Barzun, 1959, p. 142)
       It is... no exaggeration to say that sensory-motor intelligence is limited to desiring success or practical adaptation, whereas the function of verbal or conceptual thought is to know and state truth. (Piaget, 1954, p. 359)
       ntelligence has two parts, which we shall call the epistemological and the heuristic. The epistemological part is the representation of the world in such a form that the solution of problems follows from the facts expressed in the representation. The heuristic part is the mechanism that on the basis of the information solves the problem and decides what to do. (McCarthy & Hayes, 1969, p. 466)
       Many scientists implicitly assume that, among all animals, the behavior and intelligence of nonhuman primates are most like our own. Nonhuman primates have relatively larger brains and proportionally more neocortex than other species... and it now seems likely that humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas shared a common ancestor as recently as 5 to 7 million years ago.... This assumption about the unique status of primate intelligence is, however, just that: an assumption. The relations between intelligence and measures of brain size is poorly understood, and evolutionary affinity does not always ensure behavioral similarity. Moreover, the view that nonhuman primates are the animals most like ourselves coexists uneasily in our minds with the equally pervasive view that primates differ fundamentally from us because they lack language; lacking language, they also lack many of the capacities necessary for reasoning and abstract thought. (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990, p. 4)
       Few constructs are asked to serve as many functions in psychology as is the construct of human intelligence.... Consider four of the main functions addressed in theory and research on intelligence, and how they differ from one another.
       1. Biological. This type of account looks at biological processes. To qualify as a useful biological construct, intelligence should be a biochemical or biophysical process or at least somehow a resultant of biochemical or biophysical processes.
       2. Cognitive approaches. This type of account looks at molar cognitive representations and processes. To qualify as a useful mental construct, intelligence should be specifiable as a set of mental representations and processes that are identifiable through experimental, mathematical, or computational means.
       3. Contextual approaches. To qualify as a useful contextual construct, intelligence should be a source of individual differences in accomplishments in "real-world" performances. It is not enough just to account for performance in the laboratory. On [sic] the contextual view, what a person does in the lab may not even remotely resemble what the person would do outside it. Moreover, different cultures may have different conceptions of intelligence, which affect what would count as intelligent in one cultural context versus another.
       4. Systems approaches. Systems approaches attempt to understand intelligence through the interaction of cognition with context. They attempt to establish a link between the two levels of analysis, and to analyze what forms this link takes. (Sternberg, 1994, pp. 263-264)
       High but not the highest intelligence, combined with the greatest degrees of persistence, will achieve greater eminence than the highest degree of intelligence with somewhat less persistence. (Cox, 1926, p. 187)
       There are no definitive criteria of intelligence, just as there are none for chairness; it is a fuzzy-edged concept to which many features are relevant. Two people may both be quite intelligent and yet have very few traits in common-they resemble the prototype along different dimensions.... [Intelligence] is a resemblance between two individuals, one real and the other prototypical. (Neisser, 1979, p. 185)
       Given the complementary strengths and weaknesses of the differential and information-processing approaches, it should be possible, at least in theory, to synthesise an approach that would capitalise upon the strength of each approach, and thereby share the weakness of neither. (Sternberg, 1977, p. 65)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Intelligence

  • 16 אימונולוגיה

    immunology, study of the immune system and the manner in which humans and animals fight off diseases (Biology)

    Hebrew-English dictionary > אימונולוגיה

  • 17 אימונולוגייה

    immunology, study of the immune system and the manner in which humans and animals fight off diseases (Biology)

    Hebrew-English dictionary > אימונולוגייה

  • 18 supuesto

    adj.
    supposed, hypothetical, assumed, alleged.
    m.
    supposition, assumption.
    past part.
    past participle of spanish verb: suponer.
    * * *
    1 (suposición) supposition, assumption
    2 (hipótesis) hypothesis
    ————————
    1→ link=suponer suponer
    1 (que se supone) supposed, assumed
    2 (pretendido) so-called, self-styled
    1 (suposición) supposition, assumption
    2 (hipótesis) hypothesis
    \
    dar algo por supuesto,-a to take something for granted
    en el supuesto de que... supposing that...
    nombre supuesto assumed name
    * * *
    1. (f. - supuesta)
    adj.
    2. noun m.
    * * *
    1.
    PP de suponer
    2. ADJ
    1) (=falso) [nombre] assumed, false
    2) (=no demostrado) supposed
    3)

    ¡por supuesto! — of course!

    -¿puedo usar su teléfono? -¡por supuesto! — "can I use your phone?" - "of course (you can)!"

    4)
    5)

    supuesto que — frm (=dando por sentado que) assuming; (=en caso de que) in the event of

    3.
    SM (=hipótesis) assumption
    * * *
    I
    - ta adjetivo
    a) ( falso) false

    el supuesto electricista — the so-called o supposed electrician

    c)

    ¿lo sabías? - por supuesto que sí! — did you know? - of course I did!

    dar algo por supuesto — to take something for granted

    II
    masculino supposition

    en el supuesto de que tenga un accidente — should you have an accident, in the event of an accident

    * * *
    I
    - ta adjetivo
    a) ( falso) false

    el supuesto electricista — the so-called o supposed electrician

    c)

    ¿lo sabías? - por supuesto que sí! — did you know? - of course I did!

    dar algo por supuesto — to take something for granted

    II
    masculino supposition

    en el supuesto de que tenga un accidente — should you have an accident, in the event of an accident

    * * *
    supuesto1
    1 = assumption, construct, presumption, presupposition [pre-supposition].

    Ex: Also, in controlled indexing language data bases, there is often an assumption that a user will be prepared to chase strings of references or to consult a sometimes complex thesaurus.

    Ex: Often they use rather fancy words, such as 'theoretical models' or ' constructs' or 'paradigms' to describe what are, very frequently, no more than hypothetical ideas or categorisations which have little empirical evidence to back them up.
    Ex: Some of these presumptions have served only to perpetuate misconceptions of collection.
    Ex: Computers hold pre-defined and fixed presuppositions, whilst those of humans are unpredictable.
    * ¡por supuesto que no! = God forbid.
    * por supuesto = of course, surely, to be sure, certainly.
    * ¡por supuesto que no! = heaven forbid.
    * supuesto práctico = case.

    supuesto2
    2 = alleged, perceived, so-called, assumed, imagined, imaginary example, presumable, putative, reputed, presumptive, apparent.

    Ex: Meanwhile the ALA and others are making wildly improbable statements about the supposedly numerous opportunities for library school graduates due to the alleged shortage of librarians.

    Ex: The arrangements should also negotiate resistance to perceived 'American dominance', erode price differentials between Europe and the US, and permit each country to support its own online services.
    Ex: DOBIS/LIBIS contains a so-called 'help' capability.
    Ex: This article discusses the advantages of storing information on discs which have an assumed life span of 20 years.
    Ex: In recent years, then, there has been much less scaremongering about the imagined horrors of drowning in a sea of paper.
    Ex: An imaginary example for a distributed fact retrieval process, based on current tools and systems, is analysed in order to clarify the requirements of such an intermediary system.
    Ex: A study was made of 8 indexes and abstracts of presumable interest to students of communication.
    Ex: Not all putative delegates were able to attend the conference -- some, e.g., were refused visas.
    Ex: Another doctor confirmed Karr's reputed plans for sex-change surgery.
    Ex: Thirty patients with a diagnosis of presumptive bacterial conjunctivitis were assessed in a randomized trial.
    Ex: Victim of an apparent assassination attempt, his face was left permanently disfigured and pockmarked.

    * * *
    supuesto1 -ta
    1 (falso) false
    actuaba bajo un nombre supuesto he worked under a false o an assumed name
    el supuesto electricista resultó ser un ladrón the so-called o supposed electrician proved to be a thief
    2
    (que se rumorea): la radio desmintió su supuesta muerte reports of his death were denied on the radio
    su supuesta enfermedad her supposed illness
    3
    por supuesto of course
    ¿vendrás? — ¡por supuesto! are you going to come? — of course!
    ¿lo sabías? — ¡por supuesto que sí! did you know? — of course I did!
    dar algo por supuesto to take sth for granted
    supposition
    su teoría descansa en un supuesto fundamental his theory rests on one fundamental supposition
    ¿y en el supuesto de que no acepten? and supposing they don't accept?, what if they don't accept?
    partiendo del supuesto de que no sabían nada working on the assumption that they knew nothing
    en el supuesto de que tenga un accidente should you have an accident, in the event of an accident
    * * *

     

    Del verbo suponer: ( conjugate suponer)

    supuesto es:

    el participio

    Multiple Entries:
    suponer    
    supuesto
    suponer ( conjugate suponer) verbo transitivo
    1

    ◊ supongamos que lo que dice es cierto let's suppose o assume what he says is true;

    suponiendo que todo salga bien assuming everything goes OK
    b) ( imaginar):


    ¿va a venir hoy? — supongo que sí is she coming today? — I should think so o I suppose so;
    es de supuesto que se lo habrán dicho presumably o I should think he's been told;
    se supone que empieza a las nueve it's supposed to start at nine
    2 (significar, implicar) to mean;

    supuesto 1
    ◊ -ta adjetivo

    a) ( falso) false;


    el supuesto mendigo the supposed beggar

    c)


    dar algo por supuesto to take sth for granted
    supuesto 2 sustantivo masculino
    supposition
    suponer verbo transitivo
    1 (creer, imaginar) to suppose: supongamos que..., let's assume o suppose that...
    supongo que me llamarán, I presume they're going to phone me
    supongo que sí, I suppose so
    se supone que acaba a las seis, it's supposed to finish at six
    se supone que él es el entendido, he's supposed to be the expert
    te suponía en París, I thought you were in Paris
    2 (conllevar, significar) to mean, involve: no supone ningún riesgo, it doesn't involve any risk
    (la amistad, el aprecio) to mean ➣ Ver nota en mean
    ♦ Locuciones: ser de suponer: es de suponer que se lo han contado, presumably o I would imagine she's been told
    ser un suponer, to be conjecture
    supuesto,-a
    I adj pey (presumiendo: falsedad) ese supuesto artista, that so-called artist
    (: inocencia) alleged
    el supuesto asesino, the alleged murderer
    II m (conjetura) assumption
    en el supuesto de que, on the assumption that: en el supuesto de que te pregunten, supposing you are asked
    ♦ Locuciones: dar por supuesto, to take sthg for granted
    por supuesto, of course
    supuesto que, since, inasmuch that
    ' supuesto' also found in these entries:
    Spanish:
    dar
    - supuesta
    - partir
    - presupuesto
    English:
    assumption
    - boon
    - course
    - ostensible
    - professed
    - reputed
    - so-called
    - supposed
    - would-be
    - go
    - means
    - naturally
    - so
    - sure
    - surely
    * * *
    supuesto, -a
    ♦ participio
    ver suponer
    ♦ adj
    1. [hipotético] supposed;
    [culpable, asesino] alleged;
    no se ha confirmado el supuesto ataque al corazón del presidente there has been no confirmation of the president's supposed o alleged heart attack
    2. [falso] false;
    actuó bajo un nombre supuesto he acted under a false o assumed name
    ♦ nm
    supposition, assumption;
    en el supuesto de que venga assuming (that) he comes;
    esto no es más que un supuesto this is no more than a supposition;
    en estos supuestos no es válido el principio general in these cases the general rule does not apply;
    partimos del supuesto de que todo va a salir bien we're working on the assumption that everything will turn out right;
    supuestos de cancelación grounds for cancellation
    ♦ por supuesto loc adv
    of course;
    ¿te gusta? – por supuesto do you like it? – of course;
    ¿la invitarás? – por supuesto que sí/no are you going to invite her? – of course I am/of course not;
    por supuesto que puedes venir of course you can come;
    por supuesto que si te deja de interesar, te puedes retirar of course if you lose interest, you can always back out;
    dar algo por supuesto to take sth for granted;
    doy por supuesto que te interesa I take it for granted that you're interested
    * * *
    I part → suponer
    II adj supposed, alleged;
    supuesto que (ya que) since; (en caso de que) if;
    por supuesto of course;
    dar algo por supuesto take sth as read
    III m assumption
    * * *
    supuesto, -ta adj
    1) : supposed, alleged
    2)
    por supuesto : of course, absolutely
    * * *
    1. (presunto) alleged
    2. (falso) supposed / assumed

    Spanish-English dictionary > supuesto

  • 19 bionomie

    n. bionomics, ecology (study of the relationship between humans and their environment)

    Holandés-inglés dicionario > bionomie

  • 20 immuniteitsleer

    n. immunology, study of the immune system and the manner in which humans and animals fight off disease (Biology)

    Holandés-inglés dicionario > immuniteitsleer

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